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Arguments within English Theory:





The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, to ‘Brexit’, appears as a traumatic shock. Here this shock is examined in the context of the national imaginary of ‘Englishness’ and its relationship to theory. I focus on the theoretical tendency known as accelerationism, which suggests we embrace abstraction and modernity to transcend the limits of contemporary capitalism into a new post-capitalist society. Accelerationism embraces the future and modernity, in contrast with the seemingly backward-looking imaginaries of Brexit. The desire of accelerationism to transcend national limits, including these backward-looking imaginaries of Englishness, is actually shaped by these imaginaries. In this way, accelerationism and the debates around it offers ways to unlock the social, psychic and theoretical formations that condition Brexit as well. What they reveal is the way in which Brexit is shaped by a particularly ‘English’ form of modernisation.
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Arguments within English Theory:




The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, to ‘Brexit’, seems to have come as something of a traumatic shock, not only to those who campaigned to Remain but also to the Brexiteers themselves. In the mode of what we might call farcical tragedy, the Brexit result has been a trauma that keeps on giving, as the current government seems unable to grasp the magnitude and consequences of the decision. In that mode, we might recall Freud’s myth of the origin of the psyche in which a primitive living organism, ‘an undifferentiated vesicle’, receives stimuli from the outside world on its exterior.​[1]​ Due to this bombardment with stimuli, this exterior surface gradually hardens under the impact so providing a ‘protective shield’.​[2]​ Traumatic events are those that break through the protective shield, flooding the organism with stimuli. Brexit, designed to raise a protective barrier against the European Union, seems to have resulted in a traumatic shock that is now having internal effects. The calls following the vote for unity, led by Brexiteers, and the ongoing condemnation of ‘Remoaners’, promises another violent suturing to repair the damaged vesicle. Even the language of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit seems to speak to the form of ‘protective shield’ that might result from the process.
	Walter Benjamin, drawing on Freud’s myth, suggested that we understand the ‘protective shield’ as a device necessary to survive the shocks of modernity.​[3]​ I want to consider Brexit in the context of the relationship between the shocks of modernity and the imagination of ‘Englishness’. In the English national self-image, these shocks of modernity are often seen as antithetical to ‘Englishness’. In the words of T. J. Clark this national image retains

the main figures and plotlines that “England” had inherited, as a picture of itself, from the eighteenth century – the cult of the countryside, the comedy of upper-class manners, the dull decencies and resentments of the new middle classes, the lure of London, the grandeur and ambiguity of Empire.​[4]​

In particular, I want to explore the tensions between this image of ‘living in an old country’, as Patrick Wright presciently analysed,​[5]​ and the problem of modernity, at the level of theory. This might already seem very un-English, ‘theory’ being the name for a much-vilified French import. Jonathan Culler, with tongue in cheek, remarks: ‘theory is a bunch of (mostly foreign) names’.​[6]​ Yet, it might be no surprise that the shock of modernity has been received together with the shock of theory. Both these ‘traumas’, as I want to discuss, gives us keys to unlock something of the national and psychic formation of Brexit.

Brexitism and Accelerationism
Alan Finlayson has argued that the philosophical core of Brexit thinking, what he calls ‘Brexitism’, is the refusal of the future.​[7]​ This anti-political politics renders the future as unknowable and contingent, while clinging to the supposed ‘certainties’ of national sentiment. As Finlayson suggests: ‘The Brexitist conviction that there is no knowable future is symptomatic of a more widespread collapse in what we might think of as the political epistemology of modern civic nationhood.’​[8]​ Instead of the various institutional forms that collected and assessed social and political knowledge, we now have the hymning of ‘big data’ and the market as the only true arbiter of popular will. This is reminiscent of Hayek’s political philosophy, in which the complexity of markets overwhelms any capacity for rational knowledge and hence planning or social intervention.
	At first glance, such a philosophy appears deeply opposed to the thinking that has gone under the name of ‘accelerationism’. We can risk a brief initial definition of accelerationism as a mode of strategy that attempts to punch through the limits of capitalism to a new post-capitalism by accelerating forces of abstraction and technology embedded within contemporary capitalism.​[9]​ In doing so, accelerationist thinkers make a claim on the future as their province. Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, in ‘#Accelerate: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics’ (2013),​[10]​ argue that the current conjuncture is one in which ‘the future has been cancelled’ (349), and that ‘to generate a new left global hegemony entails a recovery of lost possible futures, and indeed the recovery of the future as such’ (351). If this is ‘left accelerationism’, we also have the nihilist and reactionary accelerationism associated with the work of Nick Land. Despite its very different political orientation, one obsessed with traversing to a ‘purified’ capitalism, Land’s work also makes a claim to the future. Capitalism cannot embrace that ‘fringe of desocialised experimentation’ which ‘is the sole resource of its own future’.​[11]​ In both cases, the central claim of accelerationism is an embrace of the future that would seem to defiantly transcend national borders and boundaries of the kind that form the imaginary of Brexitism.
	The articulation of a Futurist modernisation against the stultifications of national ‘backwardness’ is a common enough trope. Leon Trotsky noted, in his Literature and Revolution, that ‘Futurism obtained its most brilliant expression, not in America and not in Germany, but in Italy and in Russia’.​[12]​ If the Futurisms of other nations were successful, we could argue that accelerationism is the attempt to import or invent a Futurism for Britain.​[13]​ In his History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky diagnosed England as the ‘pioneer of bourgeois civilization’ and noted how the imperial role of England ‘softened the inner contradictions, accumulated conservatism, promoted an abundance and stability of fatty deposits in the form of a parasitic caste, in the form of a squirearchy, a monarchy, House of Lords, and the state church’.​[14]​ We might say accelerationism is posed against, precisely, these ‘fatty deposits’, aiming at a modernisation that would clear them away.
	This would leave us with an atavistic Brexitism and a future-oriented accelerationism. The dialectic, I want to suggest, is more complex than that. While accelerationism tries desperately to escape the ‘fatty desposits’ of an ageing England, at the same time this modernising fantasy speaks to the condition of our national imaginary. Similarly to the tension of Brexitism, which may refuse the future but still constructs a model of the future as uncertainty and risk, accelerationism may confidently construct a future but in doing so cannot fully grasp the conditions from which it emerges. This is not to draw any simple equivalency between Brexitism and accelerationism, but rather to treat accelerationism as a symptomatic formation of theory that expresses the desire to generate new forms of shock and new modes of absorbing modernity. Read in this way, accelerationism might help unlock some of the imaginary forms of ‘Englishness’ that form the basis of the Brexit imaginary.

Europe Endless
Deborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro castigate accelerationism as a philosophy of ‘Old Europe’, ‘sometimes displaying a strong nostalgia for the Soviet version of the modernisation front’.​[15]​ I want to suggest that accelerationism is more English than European, and has a more complex mode of looking backwards and forwards. In fact, as we will see, the accelerationists often share a dissatisfaction with ‘Old Europe’. Europe becomes a retardant force in ways that strikingly recall discourses around Brexit and the long history of British resentment of Europe and the European Union. At the same time, unlike the Brexit imaginary, Britain or England is something to also be accelerated away from. Rather than a return to an England freed from the ‘shackles’ of Europe, the aim is to look to other sites and spaces to create or imagine alternative futures.
	In the writing of Nick Land and his allies in the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU) in the 1990s and early 2000s, the geographies and temporalities are those of science fiction. Particularly influential was William Gibson’s cyperpunk ‘Sprawl trilogy’ of Neuromancer (1984), Count Zero (1986), and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988). In these novels, we see the emergence of the new deterritorialised cyberspace, a ‘consensual hallucination’ of data into which people ‘jack in’.​[16]​ This future space is accessed through technologies derived from military development that are now being used for hacking and subversion in Japan, China and the ‘Sprawl’ – the Boston-Atlanta Metropolitan Axis, which is one vast urban conurbation of the US East Coast. It may be telling that when London appears, in the final book of the trilogy, it is a space of energy but also of ‘gomi’, of waste or rubbish, which constitutes the built structures that inhabit ‘the fabric of time’.​[17]​
	For Land and the CCRU, it is these new sci-fi spaces of Japan and, especially, China that form the imaginary of acceleration against the ‘gomi’ of England. Land writes: ‘Neo-China arrives from the future’ (FN 442). This is not ‘China’ as it is, but China re-imagined through Gibson’s novels as a site of unfettered biotechnical experimentation. In a sense, Land and the CCRU are charting, in a sci-fi form, the shift of China to adopting an authoritarian capitalism: ‘Melted-out protestantism disorganizes into voodoo, and drifts towards China’ (FN 395). Nick Land, after his own ‘meltdown’ and departure from his position at the University of Warwick, would move to Shanghai. At work in the suggestion that ‘neo-China’ is a realised form of deterritorialisation is the combination of the ‘unfettered’ forces of capitalism with authoritarian organisation. While Land had earlier praised the anarchy of markets as the driver of acceleration, now it seems those markets also require an authoritarian supplement that will push beyond human constraints into new zone of experimentation. Typical of his provocative style, Land embraces what are often regarded as the ‘worst’ features of the Chinese state: a combination of ‘totalitarian’ authority with an unleashed capitalism.
	What is interesting is the peripheral but telling role that Europe plays in the accelerationist imaginary of Land and the CCRU. Sadie Plant and Nick Land declared, in 1994, that ‘1972 was designed as the year of European security integration, and as the whole system comes together, it becomes increasingly informative to simulate the thought of the cops.’​[18]​ That was the year Britain joined the European Community and integrated European Union law. For Plant and Land, it is the moment of the integrated security system, the shutting down of forces of acceleration and the space of a new form of Euro-policing. This is reinforced by their suggestion that Europe is the place of the fatherland, and ‘the fatherland is cryogenic, a fantasy of perfect preservation, whose bronze age ancestors are even now thawing out in the Alps, frozen assets under attack’.​[19]​ The imagery of the cryogenic draws not only on science fiction, but also on the discovery, in 1991, of ‘Ötzi’, a naturally-created mummy of a man who died around 3,300 BC found in a glacier on the Austro-Italian border. Ötzi is the figure of ‘frozen assets’, of European heritage, but also of a border violator, someone between two ‘fatherlands’. Again, Europe is associated with the freezing of flows, with the preservation of the past and with the fascist or Nazi ‘fatherland’.
	If ‘cyberpositive’ processes are ones which involve a runway effect of positive feedback loops, then Europe becomes the figure of a reterritorialising negative feedback loop. This is reinforced by another CCRU text, which contrasts the ‘accumulated stock footage [that] backs up speculative Euro-identity’,​[20]​ with ‘telecommercialised nomadic multiplicity [that] aborts nascent Euro-unity’.​[21]​ Europe is accumulated historical footage, the very image of the weight of history that is now the foundation for a new speculative identity, while the new networked forces of the commercial market are those which have already undermined that unity. The imagery of hackers, pirate radio and television, are the forms of ‘desocialised experimentation’ that offer an alternative future. The schema is obvious: Europe is the site of reterritorialisation, especially ‘Euro-unity’. What is striking is how this figuration of Europe as constriction or unity converges with the tropes of Euro-scepticism and Brexitism (Brussels as ‘red tape’, the inertial ‘butter mountains’ (fatty desposits literalised) and ‘wine lakes’, etc.) The drive to the future, embodied in capitalist forms of acceleration, requires a neglect and transcendence of European space, which is often then vectored through a valorisation of certain British experiences, notably post-Rave culture,​[22]​ which is one form of ‘telecommercialised nomadic multiplicity’.

The Accelerationist International
While accepting certain elements of the legacy of Nick Land and the CCRU, contemporary left accelerationism has also distanced itself from Land’s embrace of capitalism as the only global horizon of acceleration. Srnicek and Williams explicitly suggest that Land succumbs to a vision of speed and is unable to grasp accelerationism as a process of complex navigation and reworking (352). In contrast to Land’s simplification of acceleration into speed, the claim is made for a more complex spatial mapping. Unfortunately, however, this new vision of space, perhaps as a result of the brevity and compression of the manifesto form, is remarkably schematic. Srnicek and Williams call us to embrace the ‘modernity of abstraction, complexity, globality, and technology’ (354), and the ‘world of space travel, future shock, and revolutionary technological potential’ (355). This is an explicitly global vision, detached, deliberately, from the confinement of any nation state.
	One of the ways in which this global vision is articulated is as the rejection of what Srnicek and Williams call ‘folk politics’, which they are has dominated contemporary left thinking. The global reach of accelerationism, even beyond the global into space,​[23]​ is contrasted with ‘neo-primitivist localism’ (351). Certainly while such ‘localism’ in left discourse has usually been associated with community resistance, it is not difficult to extend such a diagnosis to any national or nationalist discourse of resistance.​[24]​ This makes this form of left accelerationism much less conducive to the kind of nationalism that has played such a key role in Brexit. Even if this nationalism is played as a modernising one, escaping the ‘constraints’ of Europe, left accelerationism would actively refuse such a constrained horizon for a left project.
	What drives the new left accelerationists is an attempt to meet and match the global horizon of capital. In this contest, particular spaces are relatively few and far between. The more specifically valorised moments in the ‘Manifesto’ concern past experiments that tried to instantiate a new technological mastery of the economy (357). One example chosen is the Chilean project Cybersyn, which, under the British pioneer cybernetics scholar Stafford Beer, tried to develop a management system for the Chilean economy during the presidency of Salvador Allende. The actual results of this experiment seem quite equivocal, with even those working on the project unsure of exactly how it would properly operate. Under extreme economic pressure from the United States, which would soon end in the engineered coup that destroyed the democratically elected Allende government, the system was mainly used for communication.​[25]​ The other example is the experiments of Soviet economists in the 1950s and early 60s, during the ‘thaw’ period, to modernise the Soviet planned economy. These examples may draw Danowski and Viveiros de Castro’s jibe about ‘Soviet modernisation’, but the aim seems to fall more on projects with a global or even extra-terrestrial scope that were developed within historic socialism.
	Antonio Negri, in his reflections on the manifesto, argues that it inhabits ‘an insistence on the territory as “terra”’,​[26]​ by which he means an insistence on territory as a site of struggle between forces of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The difficulty is that such a ‘terra’ seems to be lacking and, especially, explicit reflection on the ‘terra’ from which the Manifesto was launched. Again, we should note this is a potential fault of the manifesto form, which aims at sweeping judgements and diagnoses in a polemical mode. I do, however, want to suggest something more might be at stake here. The modernising drive that dominates left accelerationism is one that wants to escape England, but the embrace of the global leaves the problem of ‘Englishness’ and Europe unaddressed.

A Very British Acceleration
It might seem a wilful misreading to even link accelerationism, with its imaginaries of ‘neo-China’ or the global, to ‘little Englander’ Brexitism. My point, however, is to unlock an imaginary of modernisation that runs through these forms of theory. Despite their flight from ‘Englishness’, I want to suggest that in this flight they indicate something of what is being evaded. Perry Anderson noted the way in which English national identity conformed to ‘the projective image of society naturally held and propagated by a landowning class’.​[27]​ Nina Power, updating Anderson’s diagnosis, characterises Britain in terms of a ‘feudal financialization’.​[28]​ Accelerationism is a reaction against this. Yet problems remain in the way this accelerationism takes this image as an unspoken background. Nick Land’s explicitly neo-reactionary turn is most obviously problematic in his endorsement of a ‘futuristic, ethno-centric feudalism’.​[29]​ Here a certain feudal imaginary marks a return of the repressed in which those who are truly accelerationist are the elite that surpasses those who cannot keep up. It also, as we have seen, reproduces an imagery of Europe as containment and constraint that has run through Brexit discourse.
	The case of left accelerationism is a clearer one of a radical break with such tropes. Yet the problem of the global articulation of the project remains a difficulty. Looking outside ‘Englishness’, with the exception of an embrace of British dance music as ‘accelerator’,​[30]​ seems to evade its own point of origin. While projecting out an image of global modernisation the travails and troubles of that image in Britain remain to one side. In particular, and crucially, the role of a ‘backward’ and ‘old’ imaginary of ‘Englishness’ in powering this accelerationism. The risk is of a self-serving imagery that does not grasp the tense history of claims to modernisation that have littered the political scene in Britain, from Harold Wilson to Margaret Thatcher and beyond. Certainly, this may be in the process of being remedied as left accelerationism abandons the term accelerationism and has started to engage with the project of ‘Corbynism’.​[31]​ Of course, this scaling down of ambitions brings its own difficulties. While starting to engage with the problem of site, of ‘Englishness’, the traction of accelerationism to deal with this problem is yet unproven. 
	These tensions of accelerationism, between the local and global, also speak to Brexit as a modernising project. At first sight, as Finlayson suggests, Brexitism can be seen as a refusal of the future and the return to the verities of ‘Englishness’ – in exactly that neo-feudal form we have suggested. But Brexitism is also a modernising project in the ways in which it, negatively, takes aim at the ‘shackles’ imposed by Europe (notably labour law and human rights legislation) and tries to launch itself into a new purified acceleration. This is one largely geared towards the imaginary of Britain as an imperial power and to the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. The future implied here, if not stated, is one that aims at the paradoxical retention of certain elements of the welfare state, for some, and the unleashing of a further wave of capitalist modernisation across Britain. While not accelerationist in the usual sense, Brextism is a worldview that wants a peculiar modernisation that reinforces national identity while entering more fully into the solvent effects of the world market. In symmetry, we could add that the problem of Remain was that it linked itself to another modernising project, that of European ‘civilisation’, which had shown itself increasingly morally and politically bankrupt. The democratic deficits of the European Union and the violent imposition of austerity on Greece were just two signs that this ‘other’ modernisation was not so different from that of Brexit.
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